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INJUNCTION OF HALFWAY HOUSE
AS PRIVATE NUISANCE
In Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Needler," defendants
operated a halfway house for parolees and ex-convicts in a mixed
business-residential area. In the lower court equity proceedings plain-
tiffs, residents of the area, introduced evidence that property values
had declined since the announcement of the opening of the halfway
house. Plaintiffs also presented testimony of law enforcement officials
stating that criminal activity originates2 where criminals congregate,
and evidence contradicting defendants' alleged exclusion of alcoholics
and sexual offenders. 3 Finding that the operation of the halfway
house diminished property values in the area and caused reasonable
fear by plaintiffs for their safety, the lower court held that the half-
way house constituted a private nuisance in fact and issued the in-
junction sought by plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed the decision, ruling that the conclusions of the lower court
were not against the preponderance of the evidence. 4
1. 252 Ark. 194, 477 S.W.2d 821 (1972).
2. Id. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 822.
3. Evidence indicated that one resident had been convicted of carnal abuse
and that another had been removed for activities relating to alcohol. Id. at-,
477 S.W.2d at 821-22.
4. Needler was the second case in which the Arkansas Release Guidance
Foundation sought to establish a legal right to operate a halfway house against
the wishes of neighboring landowners. In the first action, Arkansas Release
Guidance Foundation v. Hummel, 245 Ark. 953, 435 S.W.2d 774 (1969), the
Foundation, in order to forestall legal action by the neighbors, sought a declar-
atory judgment holding the use of property as a halfway house to be within the
scope of the local zoning ordinances providing for the use of land in the area
for residential, religious, educational and philanthropic purposes. Id. at-, 435
S.W.2d at 776-77. The court of chancery found that the halfway house was
not an educational, religious or philanthropic use as contemplated in the zoning
ordinance and issued a decree enjoining the use of the land for that purpose.
The Foundation appealed, contending that the lower court erred on two issues:
first, in finding the proposed use to be a violation of the zoning ordinance; and
secondly, as "to the extent that the court may have found appellant's proposed
use of its property to be a nuisance." Id. at-, 435 S.W.2d at 776. The court
answered only the first contention, ruling that the finding of the chancellor
that the proposed use of the land was in violation of the zoning ordinance was
not against the preponderance of the evidence and should be affirmed.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Although Needler is the first Arkansas case dealing specifically
with the issue of whether a halfvay house constitutes an enjoinable
nuisance, the court chose not to discuss the quasi-public status and
alleged social utility of halfvay houses, but rather to treat the prob-
lem within the traditional framework of nuisance law as established
by Arkansas cases. The court relied on two previous Arkansas casesG
for the proposition that "equity will enjoin conduct that culminates
in a private nuisance in fact where the resultant injury to the nearby
property and residents is certain, substantial and beyond speculation
and conjecture."6 In both cases cited, the court refused to enjoin the
activities alleged to be nuisances, noting that plaintiffs had sought
injunctions prior to actual operation of the alleged nuisances and
that a lawful business could not be enjoined "unless it shall be so
operated as to become a nuisance in fact."7
The Needler court cited Arkansas case laws supporting its finding
that since "[t]he distinction between a private and public nuisance
is simply the extent of the injury, i.e., the number suffering the effects
of the nuisance,"9 the nuisance complained of by plantiffs in Needler
was private rather than public. This finding was necessary to the
result since the remedy for a public nuisance "is by action on the part
of the municipality to abate the nuisance, either by police interference
under an ordinance, or by a suit in equity to restrain the maintenance
of the nuisance."'10
Several other cases contribute to an understanding of the rationale
5. Clark v. Hunt, 192 Ark. 865, 95 S.W.2d 558 (1936); Cooper v. Whissen,
95 Ark. 545, 130 S.W. 703 (1910).
6. 252 Ark. at -, 477 S.W.2d at 822. In Clark the court refused to enjoin the
erection of a filling station near a church, declaring that "its . . . [the filling
station's] erection and operation will not be enjoined unless it shall be so operated
as to become a nuisance in fact." 192 Ark. at 868, 95 S.W.2d at 560. In Cooper,
the court reversed a lower court decree granting an injunction that barred erec-
tion of a wagon yard. Plaintiffs had argued that the yard had no provision for
the disposal of sewage and would provide a breeding place for filth and disease.
95 Ark. at 546, 130 S.W. at 703.
7. 192 Ark. at 868, 95 S.W.2d at 560.
8. City of Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724
(1922).
9. 252 Ark. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 822.
10. City of Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 101, 239
S.W. 724, 725 (1922).
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behind the decision. One Arkansas decision 1 quoted with approval
an Alabama decision 2 which stated:
Under the provisions of the constitution, private property cannot
be taken for public uses, or for corporations, without just com-
pensation being first made to the owner, except by his consent.
The courts, and it was never intended to be otherwise, are not
the "masons" to "chisel" away vested rights of property of indi-
viduals, however humble and obscure the owner, for the benefit
of the public or great corporations."1
This passage indicates the reluctance of Arkansas courts to invoke
the doctrine of comparative injury:
[A] court of equity should deny injunctive relief, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the existence of a nuisance and substantial in-
jury to plaintiff have been established, when issuance of the
injunction would cause defendant much greater hardship than
continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff.14
Several jurisdictions that generally reject the doctrine make an ex-
ception for the situation in which "the public has an interest in the
continuation of the nuisance."' 5 Arkansas courts have rejected both
the doctrine and this exception. Instead, Arkansas courts have re-
peatedly affirmed their strict adherence to the doctrine that men must
use their property so as not to injure the property of others.8 Re-
jecting the tendency to consider the reasonableness of a defendant's
use of his property under the circumstances, as several other jurisdic-
tions do,'7 Arkansas courts prohibit any use which interferes "with
11. Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State ex rel Attorney Gen., 181 Ark. 216,
26 S.W.2d. 57 (1930).
12. Drake v. Lady Ensley Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 102 Ala. 501, 14 So. 749
(1894).
13. Id. at 508, 14 So. at 751.
14. Note, Torts-Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance, 49 N.C.L. Rv.
402, 403 (1971).
15. Id. at 406.
16. Eddy v. Thornton, 205 Ark. 843, 846, 170 S.W.2d 995, 996 (1943);
Moore v. Wallis, 191 Ark. 551, 553, 86 S.W.2d 1111, 1112 (1935).
17. See, e.g., Chazen v. City of New Britain, 148 Conn. 349, 355, 170 A.2d
891, 894 (1961); McClosky v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1959); Merriam
v. McConnell, 31 Ill. App. 2d 241, 244, 175 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1961); Louisville
Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Ky. 1960); Clinic & Hosp., Inc., v.
McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384, 390 (1951); Sans v. Ramsey
Golf & Country Club, 29 N.J. 438, 449, 149 A.2d 599, 605 (1959); Reid v.
Brodsky, 397 Pa. 463, 469-70, 156 A.2d 334, 338 (1959); Caldwell v. Knox
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another's lawful right to use and enjoy his own property."18
In some nuisance cases, Arkansas courts have relieved defendants
of some of the burden imposed by this doctrine by ordering remedies
more flexible and specialized than permanent injunctions.10 It has
been held that in a case involving an activity that is not a nuisance
per se "the injunction should not restrain the entire operation . . .
but only that part of the operation that created the nuisance."20 A
flexible remedy is not available to a defendant in the absence of a
showing that defendant's business could be operated in some way
that would not continue the nuisance complained of.21 In any case,
the parties are free at any time to move the trial court to modify
the order.22
In considering the possible application of the reasoning embodied
in these opinions to the Needler case, it is noteworthy that in one
case23 defendants were permitted to continue operation of a quarry
and rock crusher that threw rocks onto adjoining land. The continued
operation was to be allowed only if defendant met certain conditions,
including the hiring of a special bailiff to oversee the operation.2 4
The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the authority of the trial
court to impose conditions on defendant's continued operation of the
quarry, stating that defendants had "the option to comply with the
terms of the decree or be permanently enjoined from operating."25
Thus the Needler court had before it precedent that would allow the
Concrete Prods., Inc., 54 Tenn. App. 393, 402, 391 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1964); Hoene
v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 116 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1962).
18. Clark v. Hunt, 192 Ark. 865, 867, 95 S.W.2d 558, 560 (1936).
19. See, e.g., Flippin v. McCabe, 228 Ark. 495, 308 S.W.2d 824 (1958)
(defendant enjoined from operating charcoal kilns during period between Decem-
ber 15 and March 15 because atmospheric conditions during that period kept
the smoke from the kilns close to the ground); Jones v. Kelley Trust, 179 Ark.
857, 18 S.W.2d 356 (1929) (defendant allowed to continue operation of quarry
subject to restrictions as to the time of blasting and expert supervision); Durfey
v. Thalheimer, 85 Ark. 544, 109 S.W. 519 (1908) (defendant ordered to close
permanently windows on second story of stable that opened onto plaintiff's bed-
room windows).
20. Flippin v. McCabe, 228 Ark. 495, 499, 308 S.W.2d 824, 827 (1958).
21. Ozark Bi-Products, Inc. v. Bohannon, 224 Ark. 17, 271 S.W.2d 354 (1954).
22. Id. at 21, 271 S.W.2d at 357; Jones v. Kelley Trust, 179 Ark. 857, 864,
18 S.W.2d 356, 359 (1929).
23. Jones v. Kelley Trust, 179 Ark. 857, 18 S.W.2d 356 (1929).




imposition on defendants of conditions designed to eliminate the
features complained of by plaintiffs. One possible condition would
be to require the halfway house to hire a special bailiff, to be approved
by the court, to inspect the records of potential residents to assure
that no men who had been convicted of sex or drug-related offenses
were admitted and to oversee the general operation of the halfway
house.G If this condition, or other measures designed by the court
and the parties, was not successful in eliminating the causes of plain-
tiffs' reasonable fears, then the operation of the halfway house could
be enjoined permanently.
The importance of the Needler decision lies not so much in the
court's treatment of the principles it applied to the facts of the case,
as in the initial choice by the court of the principles to be discussed.
The court found that the evidence supported the chancellor's finding
that the damage to plaintiffs resulting from the continued operation
of the halfway house was "certain, substantive, and beyond specula-
tion and conjecture." -7 Following earlier cases, the court noted that
the correct remedy for a private nuisance is an injunction.2 8 The
Needler court chose not to discuss the possibility of a more flexible
remedy, the reasonableness of defendant's use of its property, or the
considerations of public policy that arise in the case.
Defendants in Needler relied almost exclusively on Nicholson v.
Connecticut Halfway House,21 a Connecticut case which, as the
Needler court stated, involved "strikingly similar facts.., and reached
an opposite result." 3° In Nicholson, a group of residents in primarily
residential middle-class neighborhoods sought an injunction barring
the use of a house in the neighborhood as a halfway house for
parolees and released prisoners. Petitioners argued that they feared
residents of the halfway house would commit crimes in the area and
property values would decline if the halfway house were permitted
to open. The court rejected these arguments on the grounds that
fears of criminal activity were speculative and intangible-l and that
26. The problem of alleviating the reasonable fears of the neighbors concern-
ing criminal activity seems more amenable to this solution than the problem of
declining property values. It is also possible that defendant could not afford to
hire another employee to meet the condition suggested in the text.
27. 252 Ark. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 822.
28. Id.
29. 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966).
30. 252 Ark. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 822.
31. 153 Conn. at 511-12, 218 A.2d at 386.
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the depreciation in property values was, by itself, insufficient to war-
rant a finding that the halfway house was a nuisance.3 2 The court
emphasized that the determination of whether a particular use of
land constituted a nuisance must take into account the reasonable-
ness of the use of the land under the circumstances.3 3
The Needler court refused to follow Nicholson, distinguishing the
Connecticut case on two grounds: first, that the fears of petitioners
in Nicholson were speculative but that the fears of plaintiffs in
Needler were supported by the evidence;34 and secondly, that the
case of Howard v. Etchieson35 placed Arkansas law "in a different
posture than Nicholson." 6 This distinction cannot withstand anal-
ysis. First, the Nicholson court did not find all fears of the residents
to be speculative. Only the fears concerning criminal activity were
rejected because they were based on conjecture. The Nicholson court
did not find that the evidence of depreciated land values was spec-
ulative but rather that "the mere depredation of land values . . .
cannot sustain an injunction sought on the ground of nuisance."37
The evidentiary status of plaintiffs' case in Needler was the same:
evidence supporting fears of criminal activity was speculative and
inferential while evidence of diminished land values was certain and
substantial.38 Secondly, the Howard case, relied on by the Needler
court to distinguish Arkansas law from Connecticut law, concerned
the construction of a funeral home. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed the lower court's injunction of the construction upon a
showing that the funeral home would decrease property values, was
depressive, and restricted the activity of children. The Nicholson
court considered a Connecticut precedent similar to Howard.3D The
Nicholson court, however, found the funeral home case to be "clearly
distinguishable on its facts from the present situation."40
32. Id.
33. Id. at 510, 218 A.2d at 385.
34. 252 Ark. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 822.
35. 228 Ark. 809, 310 S.W.2d 473 (1958).
36. 252 Ark. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 822.
37. 153 Conn. at 512, 218 A.2d at 386.
38. 252 Ark. at-, 477 S.W.2d at 821-22.
39. Jack v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705 (1950). The court enjoined
operation of a funeral home in a residential neighborhood which was found to
have caused a depreciation in the value of land and a "depressed feeling to the
families in the immediate neighborhood." Id. at 421, 71 A.2d at 709.
40. 153 Conn. at 512, 218 A.2d at 386. Generally, complaints involving funeral
homes in residential areas have been treated as a special branch of the law of
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The Needler court did not use all the analytical tools available in
dealing with the unique case before it. The most important of these
tools is an explicit consideration of the various interests involved in
the case. In Gus Blass Dry Goods Co. v. Reinman.,- the Supreme
Court of Arkansas refused to enjoin the operation of a livery stable
in a commercial area, noting:
The necessities of life and growth of towns and cities require the
establishment and continuance of certain occupations, business
enterprises and works, in the conduct of which some degree of
annoyance and discomfort is necessarily incident. 42
As the court in Gus Blass Dry Goods recognized a public interest in
the maintenance of livery stables, so the Needler court could have
recognized that the public has an interest in the development of more
effective methods of restoring criminals to a useful place in society.43
These considerations might have led the court to attempt to formu-
late a remedy more flexible than a permanent injunction. Regardless
of what decision the court might have reached, a fuller and more
explicit discussion of the public and private interests at stake would
have provided clearer guidance to defendants in their attempts to
establish a private agency of potentially substantial benefit to the
public.
Gene Buzzard
nuisance. See, e.g., Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1955) and cases therein cited.
See also Comment, Equity-Funeral Homes and Cemeteries as Nuisances, 4 ARX.
LR. & B. Ass'N J. 483 (1949-50).
41. 102 Ark. 287, 143 S.W. 1087 (1912).
42. Id. at 293-94, 143 S.W. at 1090.
43. Although the efficacy of halfway houses as measured by recidivism rates
is questionable (Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs,
17 CR ME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971)), the humanitarian benefits are generally
recognized (Grygier, Nease & Anerson, An Exploratory Study of Halfway Houses,
16 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 280 (1970)).
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